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I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(a) (2001) and § 34A-1-303 (Supp. 2004).
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

This Court should refuse to consider Appellant's arguments on appeal due

to his failure to abide by Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2.

This Court should refuse to consider Appellant's arguments on appeal due

to his failure to marshal the evidence. "A party seeking to overturn the Commission's
factual findings 'must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973
P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotation omitted).
3.

The Labor Commission properly found that Appellant's work related

impairments do not prevent him from performing the essential functions of a fast food
worker, and that such work is available to him. "In reviewing the Commission's factual
findings, [this Court] will affirm them whenever they are 'supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.' Such findings will
'not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the
evidence is permissible.'" Id (quotations omitted).

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant sought permanent total disability benefits for injuries sustained while
working for Media-Paymaster Plus on October 28, 1996. Appellant was working as a
movie extra when he slipped and fell, injuring his cervical spine and right shoulder. The
Administrative Law Judge denied the requested benefits, and the Labor Commissioner
affirmed that decision. Appellant has now appealed the decision denying benefits to this
Court.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Appellant worked for 28 years for the State of Utah as a maintenance

specialist and journey maintenance supervisor at the Utah School for the Deaf and the
Blind. He retired effective July 1, 1995. He then chose work at a McDonald's
Restaurant in the Ogden area, with the starting date of March 20, 1996. Appellant
worked 30-35 hours weekly. !See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at
R459; see also Order Denying Motion for Review at R645
2.

On the date of the industrial accident, October 28, 1996, Appellant was

asked if he would like to be an extra in a media production. He was hired for two days,
but the work was completed in one. At the end of the day, he slipped on a wet surface
and fell to the floor. See R459 and R646.
3.

The accident caused a cervical spine injury that resulted in a 3% whole

person impairment, and a right shoulder injury that resulted in a 6% whole person
impairment. In addition to those work related injuries, Appellant had a preexisting non2

work back injury that accounts for an additional 3% whole person impairment. See
R646.
4.

Appellant reached medical stability from his work-related injuries on

approximately September 5, 1997. He then sought return to work at Media-Paymaster
Plus, but no work was available. He also sought to return to light-duty work at his job
with McDonald's, but no light duty work was available there. Appellant did not seek
other employment and has not worked since the day of the accident. See id
5.

Media-Paymaster Plus, through its workers compensation coverage,

provided temporary disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and medical
treatment. Resolution of disputes over these issues was addressed in a prior Order of the
Commission, which included a medical panel report. .See R459.
6.

Appellant later filed an Application for Hearing requesting permanent total

disability benefits. See R2.
7.

The Labor Commission determined Appellant had retired from his work as

a maintenance specialist and supervisor and had no intention of returning to it.
Consequently, it found his work as a maintenance person irrelevant to his claim for
permanent total disability benefits. Likewise, Appellant's work with Media-Paymaster
Plus was a short-term, one time event, and also not relevant to his claim. In contrast, the
Commission found that Appellant had been regularly employed by McDonald's for
several months prior to the accident and expected to continue working there. Therefore,
the Commission determined, Appellant's work at McDonald's is the appropriate
3

benchmark for determining whether Appellant is able to perfomi the essential functions
of his prior work. See R647.
8.

Appellant underwent several medical examinations and evaluations to

determine his ability to work. The Commission found the results of Dr. McGlothlin, an
orthopedic specialist, and Cory Davis, a physical therapist, to be the most accurate
descriptions of Appellant's true abilities. See R646-47.
9.

Dr. McGlothlin believed that Appellant was capable of at least light work

that could include occasional lifting, pushing or carrying of up to 35 pounds, and
repetitive lifting, pushing and carrying of up to 20 pounds. He also concluded that
Appellant would require the ability to change from sitting to standing every 30-60
minutes. See id.; see also R656 at pp.68-69.
10.

Cory Davis concluded that Appellant has the physical ability to perform

light work. Mr. Davis also documented substantial symptom magnification. See R64647.
11.

At the hearing, Appellant testified that he could walk/sit alternate for at

least 2 V2 hours at a time during his walks, twice daily. See R659-60. Dr. Brent Felix,
M.D., opined that Appellant was capable of at least a light duty job, involving yard work,
light carpentry work or translating, with lifting up to 25 pounds. See id.; see also R656 at
p.204. The Medical Panel stated that Appellant showed no significant difficulty in
walking, standing, or balance and believed him capable of managing a relatively stable
pattern of employment duties. See R459-60.
4

12.

Regarding the requirements and opportunities for Appellant to return to his

past employment in the fast food industry, such work can include a variety of tasks,
including sweeping and mopping, taking orders and delivering food, serving as a cashier,
general clean-up and removing garbage. Fast food employers customarily assign these
tasks to individual employees according to their respective abilities. See R646-47.
13.

Prior to the industrial accident, Appellant performed duties in all job

capacities for McDonald's, including cashier, drive-up window cashier, sandwich maker,
preparation, and lobby attendant. See R460.
14.

Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D., Appellant's vocational rehabilitation expert,

opined that due to Appellant's age, education, level of skill, physical limitations and
decreased stamina, it does not appear that he has any vocational options. See R399.
15.

In considering Dr. Farnsworth's report, however, the Commission noted

that it mistakenly relied on Appellant's self-report that he worked at McDonald's for only
two months. Based thereon, Dr. Farnsworth concluded that Appellant had not performed
the fast-food job for a sufficient time to acquire new skills. The Commission also noted
other inaccuracies in Dr. Farnsworth's report. For instance, the Functional Capacity
Checklist upon which much of Dr. Farnsworth's report was based relied on Appellant's
self-reporting rather than objective evaluation such as medical reports. In addition, in
concluding that there were no jobs available to Appellant, Dr. Farnsworth based her job
search on the incorrect assumption that he had been a janitor supervisor by trade, rather
than a maintenance worker. In addition, Dr. Farnsworth failed to consider Appellant's
5

other work experience. Due to these errors, the Commission determined that Dr.
Farnsworth's conclusions must be disregarded. See R460.
16.

Kit Bertsch, Appellant's vocational rehabilitation expert, testified and

reported that Appellant is employable as a fast-food clerk, and that such jobs are readily
available in the Ogden and North Ogden area. Moreover, Ms. Bertsch reported and
testified that she spoke with employers that posted actual job openings and they stated an
open willingness to accommodate a person with Appellant's specific limitations. Ms.
Bertsch reported that "Ms. Lori Jones, manager at Martinez's McDonald's employment
site reports that an incumbent worker could perform the essential functions of the cashier
position with one hand. Specifically, she states that a worker could perform the cash
register with one hand, [and] is not required to lift . . . ." See R461.
17.

Ms. Bertsch testified and reported in her Labor Market Survey that in the

fast food cashier position, six to ten part-time positions and two to four full-time
benefited positions are available in the Ogden and North Ogden area. All employers
surveyed (seven) stated that all persons with physical restrictions would be
accommodated in the position of cashier. Moreover, she testified and reported a person
with six months to one year of experience will have preferred hire to other applicants.
Three employers expressed a desire to hire incumbent workers who are bilingual.
Appellant testified that he speaks English and Spanish fluently. Ms. Bertsch testified that
these employers are able to accommodate Appellant's limitations through modifying nonessential functions, varying schedules, and through the use of assistive devices. See id.
6

18.

Based on the evidence presented, the Commission concluded that Appellant

is able to perform the essential functions of his prior work and such work is readily
available to him. Accordingly, it denied Appellant's claim to permanent total disability
benefits. See R458-64 and R645-49.
V.
1.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

This Court should refuse to consider Appellant's arguments on appeal due

to his failure to abide by Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically,
Appellant failed to properly cite to the record. Accordingly, Appellant's brief should be
disregarded or stricken and this Court should assume the correctness of the Labor
Commission's decision.
2.

This Court should decline to consider Appellant's challenge to the

Commission's findings in denying him permanent total disability benefits because
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's findings.
When a party fails to marshal the evidence, this Court assumes the record supports the
Commission's findings.
3.

Even if this Court considers Appellant's arguments on appeal, it should

affirm the Commission's findings supporting the denial of permanent total disability
benefits because they are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court.

VI.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE I

THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO ABIDE BY RULE 24,
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
This Court should not consider Appellant's arguments on appeal due to his failure
to abide by Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, Rule 24(e)
provides: "References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 11(b)

" Utah R. App. P. 24(e) (2004). In his brief, Appellant failed

to properly cite to the record.
Utah appellate courts have previously "voiced their frustration with briefs which
fail to comply with Rule 24," and "have routinely refused to consider arguments which
do not include a statement of facts properly supported by citations to the record" State
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (providing
appellate court "need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or
supported by, the record) (emphasis added). In fact, Rule 24 provides that briefs that are
not in compliance "may be disregarded or stricken." Utah R. App. P. 24(j). Accordingly,
because Appellant failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 24, this court should
not consider his arguments on appeal and the correctness of the Labor Commission's
decision should be assumed.

8

ISSUE II
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS.
Appellant's only argument on appeal is that the Commission's determination
denying him permanent total disability benefits failed to consider material evidence in
support of his claim for those benefits. See Appellant's Brief. However, Appellant has
failed to marshal any of the evidence supporting the Commission's findings or to
establish that they are clearly erroneous. Instead, Appellant merely states those facts
most favorable to his position and ignores the contrary evidence, something Utah
appellate courts routinely determine to be inadequate. See Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985
(quotations omitted). When a party fails to marshal the evidence, this Court assumes the
record supports the Commission's findings and shows no reluctance to affirm when the
marshaling burden has not been met. See id.
In this case, Appellant failed to marshal any of the evidence, let alone all of it as is
required of him, supporting the Commission's determination that he is not permanently
totally disabled as a result of his industrial injuries. Specifically, without mentioning all
of the evidence, Appellant ignored Dr. McGlothin's opinion, one of the opinions the
Commission characterized as being the most accurate description of Appellant's true
abilities. See R652-53. Dr McGlothlin opined that Appellant is capable of at least light
work that could include occasional lifting, pushing or carrying of up to 35 pounds, and
repetitive lifting, pushing, and carrying up to 20 pounds. See R652; see also R656 at
9

pp.68-69. Based on Appellant's description of pre-accident work duties at McDonalds,
the Commission concluded that Appellant's work-related impairments do not prevent him
from performing such functions. See R653.
Appellant also ignored the great weight the Commission gave to the opinion of
Cory Davis, P.T., who determined that not only did Appellant have the physical ability to
perform light work, but also documented substantial symptom magnification on
Appellant's part. See R652. Thus, based on these opinions, not only could the
Commission conclude that Appellant was capable of performing the essential functions
of his prior work, but also that Appellant was not a credible witness.
Appellant also failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's finding
that he could perform other work reasonably available. Specifically, Appellant ignored
the fact that Ms. Bertsch testified that he was employable as a fast food clerk, that such
jobs were readily available in the Ogden, Utah area, and that in her research she spoke
with a number of employers with relevant job openings who stated an open willingness to
accommodate a person with Appellant's limitations. See R461. In other words, there
existed substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision, all of which was
ignored by Appellant.
Based on Appellant's failure to marshal the evidence, some of which is
demonstrated above, this Court should decline to consider Appellant's challenge to the
Commission's decision not to award him permanent total disability. .See Whitear, 973
P.2dat985.
10

ISSUE III
THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT'S
WORK RELATED IMPAIRMENTS DO NOT PREVENT HIM FROM
PERFORMING THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF A FAST FOOD WORKER,
AND THAT SUCH WORK IS READILY AVAILABLE TO HIM.
Appellant argues that the Commission's decision denying him permanent total
disability benefits failed to consider material evidence regarding his work limitations and
the availability of work, and lacked sufficient detail. See Appellant's Brief at p.l. "In
reviewing the Commission's factual findings, [this Court] will affirm them whenever
they are 'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the w7hole record
before the court.' Such findings will 'not be overturned if based on substantial evidence,
even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible.'" Whitear, 973 P.2d at 984.
In this case, the Commission's decision was well reasoned and supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, this Court should affirm that decision.
U.C.A. § 34A-2-413 establishes a two-step process for adjudicating claims for
permanent total disability. First, the injured worker bears the burden of proving all of the
elements set forth in § 34A-2-413(l). These include (1) that the employee is not
gainfully employed; (2) that the employee has an impairment that limits his ability to do
basic work activities; (3) that the impairments prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the work for which he was qualified before the accident; and (4)
that the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413 (2001). If the injured worker establishes a prima facie claim, a tentative
n

finding of permanent total disability is entered. The Respondent is then given the
opportunity to develop and submit a re-employment plan. The Administrative Law Judge
must then conduct additional proceedings, a re-employment hearing, to determine
whether Petitioner can be re-employed or rehabilitated pursuant to § 34A-2-413(6). See
E.E.J, v. Home Care Professional Utah Labor Commission Decision, Case Nos. 98-0660
and 98-1059 (August 30, 2000); C.A.B. v. Harper Excavating, Inc., Appeals Board
Decision of the Utah Labor Commission, Case No. 96-0686 (August 29, 2000); E.E.J, v.
Home Care Professionals. Inc., Utah Labor Commission Decision, Case No. 98-0660b
(February 28, 2001).
Appellant argued before the Labor Commission that the evidence demonstrated
that he satisfied all four requirements for a preliminary determination of permanent total
disability. However, the Labor Commission determined that Appellant did not
sufficiently demonstrate: (a) that his impairments prevented him from performing the
essential functions of the work activities for which he has been qualified prior to the
industrial accident, and (b) that he could not perform other work reasonably available.
See R458-65, R645-49. Because Appellant cannot demonstrate that the Commission's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence, this Court should affirm.
A.

THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
APPELLANT CAN PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
WORK HE WAS QUALIFIED TO PERFORM BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
Appellant first argues that the Commission's Order failed to consider evidence

that fast-food work requires the use of both hands and that his FCE demonstrated that he
12

could not perform such work. See Appellant's Brief at pp. 1-5. However, there existed
substantial evidence presented below to support the Commission's decision, and thus
those findings should not be overturned. In other words, there was sufficient evidence
demonstrating that Appellant can perform the essential functions of the work he was
qualified to perform before the industrial accident.
The evidence presented to the Labor Commission demonstrated that Appellant is
capable of working in the light physical demand work level. Not only did Appellant's
functional capacity examination place him in the light work category, but Dr.
McGlothlin, Dr. Felix, and Cory Davis, P.T., also found him capable of light work. See
R459-60. In addition, as the Commission points out, the Medical Panel also found
Appellant capable of managing a relatively stable pattern of employment duties. See id.
While Appellant claims that the Commission failed to consider the effect the limited use
of his hands may have on his ability to perform such work, that is simply not the case.
The Commission specifically discussed how working in the fast food industry can include
a variety of tasks, including sweeping, mopping, taking orders, delivering food,
cashiering, general cleanup, and garbage removal. See R647. In addition, the
Commission found that fast-food employers customarily assign tasks to individual
employees according to that employee's respective abilities. See id. Finally, as
discussed below, a number of fast-food employers in the Ogden area stated that they had
work available for an individual of Appellant's age, physical abilities, education,
language skills and previous experience. Accordingly, there was more than sufficient
13

evidence demonstrating that Appellant can perform the type of work he was qualified to
perform prior to the accident, and thus the Commission's finding in that regard was
proper.
B.

THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THERE
EXISTS OTHER WORK REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT.
The evidence also sufficiently demonstrated that there exists work reasonably

available that Appellant is able perform, contrary to Appellant's argument that MediaPaymaster Plus' expert admitted that no jobs were available to Appellant. Accordingly,
the Commission's finding in that regard was also proper.
At the hearing, Media-Paymaster Plus' expert, Ms. Kit Bertsch, testified that she
spoke with a number of employers that posted fast-food job openings, discussed
Appellant's specific physical restrictions along with his background and experience, and
found that many of them would be willing to provide accommodations and/or
modifications to allow a person in Appellant's situation to perform the essential functions
of the job. See R531-35. Three of the potential employees indicated that they would
accommodate Appellant by modifying duties, or in other words eliminating certain tasks
and adding other tasks that are compatible with physical capabilities, work shift, hours
worked, and breaks in between as needed. See id. In fact, the manager at Appellant's
McDonald's employment site reported that an incumbent worker could perform the
essential functions of the cashier position with one hand and is not required to lift. See
R445 In addition, Ms. Bertsch reported in her Labor Market Survey that in the fast food
cashier position, six to ten part-time positions and two to four full time benefited
14

positions are available in the Ogden and North Ogden area. See id. All the employers
surveyed (seven) stated that all persons with physical restrictions would be
accommodated in the position of cashier. See id. Three employers expressed a desire to
hire incumbent workers who are bilingual and have already obtained their food handler
permit. See id. Simply stated, Appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient
and the required factual findings were not made for the Labor Commission to deny his
claim for permanent total disability is without merit.
Appellant is alleging that if he cannot perform such work as it is described when
posted then such work is non-existent. See Appellant's Brief at pp. 7-8. That argument
ignores both the actual jobs that exist (as testified to by Ms. Bertsch) and the purpose and
effect of the American with Disabilities Act, which provides that covered entities "shall
not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a). The Act further
provides that the term "discriminate" includes "limiting, segregating or classifying a job
applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee." 42
U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(1). Finally, the Act requires a covered entity to make reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the covered entity
15

can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
In this case, Media-Paymaster Plus presented evidence that Appellant could
perform the essential functions of light duty fast food work, and that there existed actual
employers in that industry within close proximity to Appellant's residence that would,
and wanted to, accommodate his disabilities. The Labor Commission concluded that
Appellant had not met his burden and properly rejected his argument that real
employment opportunities should be ignored. As stated by one Florida court in a
sheltered employment case: "Reasonable job modification for the purpose of
accommodating an injured or partially disabled employee will not. . . place the job
outside of the definition of gainful employment. In point of fact, pervasive federal law
now requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for their disabled
employees." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Liggon, 668 So.2d 259, 271 (Fl. App. 1 Dist,
1996). To follow Appellant's logic would be to engage in a fiction and ignore both the
very real work opportunities that were proven to exist and the federal laws that were
created to protect Appellant and others similarly situated. Appellant thus failed to meet
his burden of proving that there is no other work reasonably available that he can
perform. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's Order denying
Appellant permanent total disability benefits.

16

VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Media-Paymaster Plus respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the Labor Commission's decision denying Appellant permanent total
disability benefits.
DATED this ^ l ^ d a y 0 f January, 2005.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

j/\(^/f/m?

Stuart F. Weed
Christian S. Collins
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

19

34A-2-413

UTAH LABOR CODE

Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692
P.2d 779 (Utah 1984) (decided before 1988
amendment).
A worker's cause of action accrues when the
industrial accident occurs; a worker who knew
of his accident within the eight-year limitations
period and had his first medical operation
withi* that period, but sought to amend his
award after that period was.time-barred from
bringing such claims M'ddlestadt v. Indus.
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Test of t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y .
Employee who had only partial loss of vision
which w a s subject to correction by use of
glasses did not sustain total disability; the test
of such disability being whether it prevent*
employee from doing work Tor which he is

WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

adapted, and not that in which he was injured.
United States Smelting, Ref & Mining Co. v.
Evans, 35 F 2 d 459 (8th Cir 1929), cert, denied,
281 U S 744, 50 S. Ct 350, 74 L. Ed. 1157
(1930).
Unknown preexisting condition,
m e r Ra a c c i d e n t a g g r a v a t e d a preexisting
a s y m p t o m a t i c condition of employee, he was
e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c o m p e n S a t i o n %r t h e
twent
P
-J.
p e r c e n t w h o l e perS0 n p e r m a n e n t p a r t i a ]
pairment caused by the accident. Crosland v.
Board of
Review, 828 P2d 528 (Utah Ct. App ),
cprt
- denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
_.. , . n
_
_
. _
-„„_,„,
™?*™*£Z%y
**PP Constr. Co , 720 P2d
1363 ( U t a n I986)
'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C J S Workmen's Compensation
§ 562 et seq
AJL.R. — Workers* compensation: reopening

lump-sum
compensation
A L R 5th 127.

payment,
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34A-2-413. Permanent total disability —Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial
accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation
as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of
evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct
cause of the employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission
shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupation ally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability
claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available,
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other
than those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
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Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented to the commission, but is not
binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week
entitlement, compensation shall be 66-%% of the employee's average weekly
wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage a t the time of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate
under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment on or before J u n e 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312
weeks of pennanent total disability compensation except as outlined in
Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided
in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections
34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of compensation
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection f2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the
employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the
employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for
any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation
at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total
disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liabilit)
under Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment on or alter Jul) 7 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent tota
disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pa)
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as providec
in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Section?
34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of compensator
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent tota
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
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(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the
employer or its insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability
compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the
employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final,
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured
Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified
rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to
gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides
the administrative law judge notice that the employer or its insurance
e a r n e r will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds
a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding
rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plan submitted by the
employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge
shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits
due the employee.
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any
disability payments made under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate
disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit
a reemployment plan If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily
submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job placement services, or incentives
calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The c r u p p e r or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue
the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure
to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
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(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the
employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation ben

efits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the
commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady
work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for i
permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate
part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided tha
employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify th«
employee from Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employmen
process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time wort
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross incom
from the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the en
ployer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent tot*
disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $50<
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or ii
insurance carrier, a permanently totally disabled employee may obtai
medically appropriate, part time work subject to the offset provisior
contained in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-tirr
work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7)
governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of pro
to show that medically appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would requi
the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical cap?
ity and residual functional capacity or for good cause, or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance rarrier to reduce permane
total disability benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonab
medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but t
employee has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabili
tion is possible but the employee has some loss of bodily function, the awa
shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is I
entitled to disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates w
any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Ut
Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss wtthi
prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law juc
finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative 1
judge states specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudi
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both ban
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two si
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body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding or permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection
(10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a
permanent total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (10),
for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment
responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently
totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three
years after an award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer
or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations
and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110;
and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires
approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a
reexamination with appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to
rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable
expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's
claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge
may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability
benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding
reveal evidence that reasonably raises the issue of an employee's
continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be
accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or selfinsured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently
totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) demonstrates good
cause, as determined by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the sole basis for termination of an
employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of
the employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work
under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or
hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and
condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge
may awaid reasonable attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an
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employee to represent the employee's interests with respect to reexan
nation of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employ
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorne
fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition
the permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employ
fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employe
Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disabili
compensation benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to aj
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall
given effect without the invalid provision or application.
tions (l)(d) and (9) and as a substitute
"Chapter 3a" in Subsection (6Xc), substitut
"34A-2-703" for "35A-3-703" in Subsectit
(3)(a) and (3Xe), "34A-2-410 through 34A
412" and "34A-2 501 through 34A-2 507"
"35A-3-410 through 35A-3 412" and "35A-3 I
through 35A-3-507" in Subsections (3Kb) a
(4Kb), "Chapter 8" for Chapter 9, Part 2"
Subsection(6)(a)(i), "34A-2-110" for "35A-3 1
in Subsection (UXcXv), and "34A-1-309"
"35A 3-805" in Subsection (11 Kg); added"is g.
erned by Part 8, Adjudication" at the end
Subsection (7)(f)(ii), substituted "Division
Adjudication" for "department" in Subsecti
(HXfXi); inserted "as determined by the Di
sion of Adjudication" in Subsection (HXfX
and made stylistic changes.

History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 116, 5 4; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12,
§ 1; 1991, ch. 136, § 12; 1992, ch. 53, § 2;
1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 121.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as
last amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1,
relating to permanent total disability, effective
July 1, 1988, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-3413 ; substituted "commission" and "administrative law judge" for "department" where the
terms appear; inserted references to "Chapter
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" in Subsec-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
would be permanently disabled as matter
law, it was for commission to decide from ail t
facts and circumstances in evidence whether
was so disabled Johnson v Industrial Comiti
93 Utah 493, 73 P2d 1308 (1937)
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Arm injuries.
Commencement of benefits.
Determination of character of disability
Estoppel.
Evidence.
Eye injurips
Findings.
Law in effect.
Maximum benefits.
Multiple injuries.
Odd lot doctrine.
Permanent disability.
— Benefits
Prior accidents contributing to disability.
Proceedings before commission.
Refusal to submit to operation.
Statute of limitations.
Total disability.
— Question of fact.
Cited.

Commencement of benefit*.
It is within the sound discretion of the co
mission to determine the commencement di
of benefits for total permanent disability
long as the determination is supported by si
stantial evidence and not patently unreasi
able Oman v Industrial Comm'n, 735 F2d 6
(Utah Ct App), cert denied, 765 P2d 12
(Utah 1987) But see Heaton v Second Injt
Fund, 796 P2d 676 (Utah 1990), noted unc
catchhne "Permanent disability — Benefit
below.

Arm injuries.
Where there was no complete and permanent
loss or loss of use of both arms so that claimant

Determination of character of disabiliti
Whether an employee is totally disabled
permanently disabled are ultimate matters
be dpcided by the commission, as is also amoo
and time compensation may be awarded up
all the evidence, and upon these ultimate qui
tions expert witnesses may not properly i
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MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS/CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS

*

Defendants.

*

Case No. 00-0673

*

Enrique Martinez asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
George's denial of Mr. Martinez's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
While temporarily working as a movie extra for Media on October 28,1996, Mr. Martinez
injured his cervical spine and right shoulder. On July 31, 2000, he filed an application with the
Commission to compel Media to pay permanent total disability compensation for his injuries. Judge
George held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Martinez5 claim on May 3, 2001. On July 15, 2003,
Judge George denied the claim on the grounds that Mr. Martinez remained able to work. Mr.
Martinez now seeks Commission review of Judge George's ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Because Judge George's decision omits relevant facts, but also includes other material that is
irrelevant, the Commission makes the following findings of fact regarding Mr. Martinez's claim for
permanent total disability compensation.
Mr. Martinez was born on August 21, 1939. He has a high school diploma and attended
college for several semesters. He speaks English and Spanish.
On July 1,1995, after working 28 years as a maintenance specialist for the State of Utah, Mr.
Martinez retired. Nine months later, on March 20,1996, he accepted employment at a McDonald's
fast-food restaurant. His duties included food preparation, mopping and sweeping, and removal of
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garbage bags weighing between 20 and 35 pounds. His work at McDonald's also involved some
unspecified amount of kneeling, stooping and bending.
On October 28, 1996, while Mr. Martinez was still employed at McDonald's, he accepted
additional work as a movie extra for Media. That same day, while working for Media, he slipped
and fell on a wet floor. This accident caused: 1) a cervical spine injury that resulted in a 3% whole
person impairment;1 and 2) a right shoulder injury that resulted in a 6% whole person impairment.2
In addition to these work-related injuries, Mr. Martinez has a preexisting non-work back injury that
accounts for an additional 3% whole person impairment.
Mr. Martinez reached medical stability from his work-related injuries on approximately
September 5,1997. He then sought to return to work at Media, but no work was available. He also
sought to return to light-duty work at McDonald's, but was told no light-duty work was available.
Mr. Martinez did not seek other employment and has not worked since the date of his accident at
Media.
Since reaching medical stability, Mr. Martinez has undergone several medical examinations
and evaluations of his ability to work. The results of those examinations are summarized as follows:.
• Dr. Casey, Mr. Martinez's chiropractor, believes Mr. Martinez can: 1) occasionally move
around on foot; 2) frequently remain in a normal seated position; 3) occasionally lift objects
weighing up to 10 pounds and rarely lift object weighing 25 pounds; and 4) occasionally hold,
pinch and feel objects with his hands and fingers. However, Dr. Casey does not believe Mr.
Martinez can climb or descend ladders, crawl, or maintain equilibrium on wet, narrow or
moving surfaces.
• Dr. McGlothin, an orthopedic specialist, believes Mr. Martinez is capable of at least light
work that could include occasional lifting, pushing or carrying of up to 35 pounds, and
repetitive lifting, pushing, and carrying of up to 20 pounds. Dr. McGlothin also concluded
that Mr. Martinez would require the ability to change frcm sitting to standing every 30 to 60
minutes.
•
Cory Davis, a physical therapist, concludes that Mr. Martinez has the physical ability to
perform light work. Mr. Davis also documented substantial symptom magnification on Mr.
Martinez's part.
For his part, Mr. Martinez claims he is extremely limited in nearly all movements and
exertions. However, Mr. Martinez's description of his limitations does not conform to many of the
3 rd party observations and evaluations in the record, Mr. Martinez's previous statements to medical
1 The medical panel appointed in this matter characterized Mr Martinez's work-related cervical
spine injury as "medically documented injury, persisting symptoms, mild degenerative changes,
and permanent activity restrictions."
2 The medical panel characterized Mr. Martinez's work-related right shoulder injury as
"limitation of ROM (range of motion)" in both adduction and forward flexion.
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providers, or his description of various activities he has engaged in. On balance, the Commission
accepts the evaluations of Dr. McGlothin and Mr. Davis to be the most accurate descriptions of Mr.
Martinez's true abilities.
Regarding the requirements and opportunities for Mr. Martinez to return to his past
employment in the fast-food industry, such work can include a variety of tasks, including sweeping
and mopping, taking orders and delivering food, serving as cashier , mopping, sweeping, general
clean-up and removing garbage. Fast-food employers customarily assign these tasks to individual
employees according to the employees' respective abilities. Many fast-food employers in the Ogden
area have work available for an individual of Mr. Martinez's age, physical abilities, education,
language skills and previous experience.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
There is no question that Mr. Martinez suffered accidental work-related injuries to his
cervical spine and right shoulder while working for Media on October 28,1996. He therefore meets
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act's general standard of eligibility for benefits, set forth in § 401
of the Act. However, to qualify for permanent total disability compensation, Mr. Martinez must also
satisfy each of the elements of § 413(1) of the Act.
The dispute in this case centers on two of §413(l)'s specific requirements: 1) that Mr.
Martinez' work-related impairments prevent him from doing the essential functions of his prior
work; and 2) that he cannot perform other work reasonably available to him, considering his age,
education, work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity.
Mr. Martinez' ability to do the essential functions of his prior work. Mr. Martinez presents
the unusual situation of having worked in three entirely different occupations within 16 months of
his accident. Consequently, the first question the Commission must consider is which of these three
occupations are relevant in evaluating Mr. Martinez' ability to do the essential functions of prior
work.
While Mr. Martinez spent the largest part of his work life as a maintenance person, he had
retired from that work well before his accident and had no intention of returning to it. Consequently,
the Commission does not consider Mr. Martinez' prior work as a maintenance person relevant to his
current claim for permanent total disability compensation. Likewise, even though Mr. Martinez'
accident occurred while he worked for Media as a movie extra, that work was a short-term, one-time
event. The Commission does not consider such work relevant to his current claim. In contrast, Mr.
Martinez had been regularly employed by McDonalds for several months prior to his accident. At
the time of the accident he expected to continue working at McDonalds. The Commission therefore
concludes that Mr. Martinez' work at McDonalds is the appropriate benchmark for determining
whether Mr. Martinez is able to perform the essential functions of his prior work.
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Mr. Martinez has described his pre-accident work duties at McDonalds as including food
preparation, mopping and sweeping, and removal of garbage bags weighing between 20 and 35
pounds. He also reports, without further explanation, that the work included some kneeling,
stooping and bending. The preponderance of evidence regarding his current capabilities establishes
that he is capable of at least light work that could include occasional lifting, pushing or carrying of
up to 35 pounds, and repetitive lifting, pushing, and carrying of up to 20 pounds. Based on this
comparison between Mr. Martinez' abilities and the essential functions of his prior work, the
Commission concludes Mr. Martinez's work-related impairments do not prevent him from
performing such functions.
Mr. Martinez' ability to perform other work reasonably available. Section 413(1) of the Act
also requires Mr. Martinez to establish that he cannot perform other work reasonably available,
considering his age, education, work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capcity.
Media has presented persuasive evidence that many employers in the fast-food business have work
immediately available for someone with Mr. Martinez' background and abilities. The fact that each
fast-food restaurant has a variety of tasks that must be performed by a crew of several employees
allows employers in the industry to accommodate someone with limitations such as Mr. Martinez.
Furthermore, Mr. Martinez' education and work experience, as well as his language abilities, are
characteristics that increase his employability.
Summary. In order to qualify for permanent total disability compensation, Mr. Martinez
must satisfy each of the elements established by §413(1) of the Act. As discussed above, the
Commission concludes Mr. Martinez has failed to meet two of those elements. The Commission
therefore concurs with Judge George's ultimate conclusion that Mr. Martinez is not entitled to
permanent total disability compensation.
ORDER
The Commission denies Mr. Martinez's motion for review and affirms Judge George's denial
of Mr. Martinez's claim for permanent total disability compensation. It is so ordered.
Dated this / 5 day of June, 2004.

J

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Enrique Martinez, Case No. 00-0673, was mailed first class postage prepaid this j£ day of June,
2004, to the following:
ENRIQUE MARTINEZ
2117 LINCOLN AVENUE
OGDENUT 84401
MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS
1992 EAST DRAPER PKWY #424
DRAPER UT 84020
RICHARD BURXE, ATTORNEY
648 EAST 100 SOUTH #200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
STUART F WEED, ATTORNEY
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #1800
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
Orders\00-0673
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 3 RD FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114
CASE NO. 2000673
ENRIQUE MARTINEZ,

*

Petitioner,

*
*

vs.

*
*

MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS (self-insured,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints),

*
*
*

Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Judge Donald L. George

*

HEARING:

May 03, 2001 @ 10:00 a.m. in Room 336
Heber M. Wells Building, 3rd Floor
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615

APPEARANCES:

Enrique Martinez (hereinafter Petitioner) appeared and was
represented by Richard R. Burke.
Respondent Media-Paymaster Plus (hereinafter Respondent), selfinsured, was represented by Stuart F. Weed

Having reviewed the file including the extensive Social Security Disability
documentation submitted post-hearing, the nine exhibits, my notes of the hearing, and the
parties' closing arguments, and having had an opportunity to observe the testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner testified on his own behalf. Petitioner called Kristy Famsworth, Ph.D. as a
vocational expert to testify on his behalf. The parties stipulated that Dr. Famsworth qualified as
a vocational rehabilitation expert.
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Respondent called Kit Bertsch as a vocational expert to testify on its behalf. After voir
dire by Petitioner's attorney, the parties stipulated that Ms. Bertsch qualified as a vocational
rehabilitation expert.
Petitioner testified he worked for 28 years for the State of Utah as a maintenance
specialist and journey maintenance supervisor at the Utah School for the Deaf and the Blind. He
retired effective July 1, 1995. He then chose work at a McDonald's Restaurant in the Ogden
area, with the starting date of March 20, 1996 {See Exhibit R5). Plaintiff testified he worked 3035 hours weekly.
Petitioner testified that on the date of the industrial accident, October 28, 1996, he was
sitting in a restaurant when a woman approached and asked if he would like to be an extra in a
media production. He was hired by Respondent for two days, but the work was completed in
one. At the end of the day, he slipped on a wet surface and fell to the floor.
The employer, through its workers compensation coverage, provided temporary disability
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and medical treatment. Resolution of disputes
over these issues was addressed in a prior order of the Commission, which included a medical
panel report.
At the time of the accident, Petitioner had retired from his work as a maintenance
specialist and supervisor. While he still possessed the skills from his nearly 30 years of state
service, he chose to leave that profession over one year prior to the industrial accident. When the
accident occurred, his regular employment was working in the fast food area at McDonald's.
Petitioner filed this Application for Hearing requesting permanent total disability benefits.
Petitioner is capable of working in the light physical demand work level. In the
functional capacity evaluation performed October 23 and 24, 2000, Petitioner's performance
placed him in the light category. (Rl, p. 22). Petitioner's reaching was restricted with the right
upper extremity, and his dexterity was generally poor due to reported fatigue. Id. However, the
physical therapist noted that Petitioner's performance validity was poor, with four out of six
Waddell signs positive, less than consistent effort in grip testing, excessive pain ratings, selflimitation without observable physical signs of effort, inconsistencies in use of reportedly injured
body region, and symptom magnification. (Rl, pp 18, 21-22)
At the hearing, Petitioner testified he could walk/sit alternate for at least 2 lA hours at a
time during his walks, twice daily. Dr. Brent Felix, M.D., stated that Petitioner was capable of at
least a light duty job, involving yard work, light carpentry work or translating, (Rl, p. 204), with
lifting up to 25 pounds. The Medical Panel stated that Petitioner showed no significant difficulty
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in walking, standing, or balance (Rl, p. 6) and believed him capable of managing a relatively
stable pattern of employment duties. (Rl, pp 7-8).]
Based upon the medical evidence and Petitioner's testimony at hearing, Petitioner can
work light duty with limited use of his right hand. The evidence further demonstrates that
Petitioner can perform the essential functions of the work he was qualified to perform before the
accident.
Petitioner testified, and the employment records confirm ® 5), that he worked at
McDonald's in Ogden, Utah, approximately eight months before the 10-28-96 date of injury, and
continued to work there into December, 1996. He performed duties in all job capacities for this
employer, including cashier, drive-up window cashier, sandwich maker, preparation, and lobby
attendant.
Petitioner's witness Farnsworth's report mistakenly relies on Petitioner's self-report that
he worked at McDonald's only two months. Ms. Farnsworth concluded from the two-month
representation that Petitioner had not performed this job for a sufficient time to acquire new
skills.
Some of the other information in Farnsworth's report is not accurate, for instance, the
Functional Capacity Checklist upon which much of Ms. Farnsworth's report was based, relies on
Petitioner's self-reporting rather than objective evaluation, such as in the medical reports as
discussed above. Ms. Farnsworth concluded that there are no jobs available for Petitioner, but
based her job search on the assumption that he was a janitor supervisor by trade. (P 1, p 15)
Likewise, the Social Security Administration's technical rationale for its finding of disability
assumed that Petitioner's past work was that of a janitor with no transferable skills. (P 2) Both
assumptions are incorrect. The record shows, and Petitioner testified, that his 28 years at the
Utah School for the Deaf and Blind were spent as a maintenance specialist and journeyman
maintenance supervisor. Petitioner's duties and experience at the school included organizing and
supervising teams of workers, completing quality control checks, building cleaning, construction,
electrical, plumbing, HVAC repair, service and preventative maintenance, painting, mixing paint,
cutting and installing windows, boiler operations, and working from blueprints. ® 3, p 5;
Petitioner's Resume) Thus, the conclusions of Petitioner's expert and the Social Security
Administration were based on incorrect fundamental assumptions. They each conclude that there
is no work available for Petitioner, however, because these conclusions are based on invalid
information, they must be disregarded.
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While Dr. Alan Casey's recommended restrictions submitted by Petitioner are much more drastic, Petitioner
has apparently waived any reliance on the same through his arguments at hearing and in closing argument.
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Respondent's witness, Ms. Bertsch, testified that with the amount of experience actually
obtained by Petitioner at McDonald's, he "completed the specific vocational preparation time
and currently possesses the skill and experience necessary to perform this past relevant job." ®
3,pp5,9)
Ms. Bertsch testified and reported that "Mr. Martinez is employable in his past
occupation of Fast Food Clerk." ® 3, p 9) She further testified and reported that such jobs are
readily available in the Ogden and North Ogden area. ® 4) Petitioner alleged that such jobs are
not suitable for him due to his limitations, particularly his limited right hand use. However, Ms.
Bertsch testified that she spoke with the employers that posted job openings identified in Exhibit
R 4, and they stated an open willingness to accommodate a person with Petitioner's specific
limitations. Ms. Bertsch reported that "Ms. Lori Jones, Manager at Mr. Martinez's McDonald's
employment site reports that an incumbent worker could perform the essential functions of the
cashier position with one hand. Specifically, she states that a worker could work the cash register
with one hand, [and] is not required to lift..." (R 3, p 9)
Ms. Bertsch testified and reported in her Labor Market Survey ® 4) that in the fast food
cashier position, six to ten part-time positions and two to four full-time, benefitted positions are
available in the Ogden and North Ogden area. All employers surveyed (seven) stated that all
persons with physical restrictions would be accommodated in the position of cashier. Moreover,
she testified and reported a person with six months to a one year of experience will have
preferred hire. Three employers expressed a desire to hire incumbent workers who are bilingual.
Petitioner testified he speaks English and Spanish fluently. Ms. Bertsch testified that these
employers are able to accommodate Petitioner's limitations through modifying non-essential
functions, varying schedules, and through the use of assistive devices.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UCA § 34A-2-413 establishes a two-step process for adjudicating claims for permanent
total disability. First, the injured worker must establish a prima facie claim proving the elements
set forth in § 34A-2-413(l). These include (1) that the employee is not gainfully employed; (2)
that the employee has an impairment that limits his ability to do basic work activities; (3) that the
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work for which
he was qualified before the accident; and (4) that the employee cannot perform other work
reasonably available. If the injured worker establishes a prima facie claim, a tentative finding of
permanent total disability is entered. The Respondent is then given the opportunity to develop
and submit a re-employment plan. The Administrative Law Judge must then conduct additional
proceedings, a re-employment hearing, to determine whether Petitioner can be re-employed or
rehabilitated pursuant to § 34A-2-413(6). See, E.E.J, v. Home Care Professional, Utah Labor
Commission Decision, Case Nos. 98-0660 and 98-1059 (August 30, 2000); CA.B. v. Harper
Excavating, Inc., Appeals Board Decision of the Utah Labor Commission, Case No. 96-0686
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(August 29, 2000); E.E.J, v. Home Care Professionals, Inc., Utah Labor Commission Decision,
Case No. 98-0600b (February 28, 2001).
The issues currently before the Commission are whether Petitioner is gainful employed,
whether Petitioner's impairments prevent him from performing the essential functions of the
work activities for which he has been qualified prior to the industrial accident, and whether the
Petitioner can perform other work reasonably available.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing in this matter,
Petitioner's impairments do not prevent him from performing the essential functions of the work
activities for which he has been qualified prior to the industrial accident of 10-28-96.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing in this matter, the
Petitioner can perform other work reasonably available.
The "odd lot" doctrine is not applicable in this case because of the statutory change which
occurred prior to the date of injury. Petitioner relies on the Marshall and Hoskings cases, as cited
in his closing arguments, arguing that the odd-lot doctrine requires Respondent to show actual
jobs available. Petitioner's reliance on the Marshall and Hoskings cases is misplaced. First,
those cases deal with claims arising under prior workers compensation law, before the enactment
of § 34A-2-413 as it applies to this case. § 34A-2-413 is more detailed and expansive in its
requirements for permanent total disability then the former odd-lot doctrine was. In the present
case, the odd-lot doctrine does not govern Petitioner's claim. Rather, the multi-step process
detailed in § 34A-2-413 does. Second, Hoskings dealt with the issue of retraining, and whether
"actual" jobs existed that the employee could perform without the need for retraining. The only
modifications required in the present case are to limited duties detailed in the job listings - duties
that these employers have stated they are willing to modify as needed, to accommodate
Petitioner's limitations. In Hoskings, the changes required were in the Petitioner's skills and
training. That is not the case here. Respondent has shown that there are jobs available which
Petitioner can perform right now without retraining, and that he has a competitive edge in
obtaining due to his prior experience in the same work and his bilingual abilities. His physical
limitations are not an issue for the employers. Ms. Bertsch testified that these employers are able
to accommodate Petitioner's limitations through modifying non-essential functions, varying
schedules, and through the use of assistive devices to aid his reduced dexterity. Thus, Petitioner
can perform the essential functions of his prior employment, and such work is readily available in
his area of residence.
Petitioner argues that because the job postings do not match precisely with his limitations,
that should be the end of the inquiry. He would have the Commission make its decision without
fully investigating the employment opportunities that exist and without presenting his particular
case to prospective employers and taking advantage of the laws and policies meant to protect and
5

benefit him. To follow Petitioner's logic would be to engage in a fiction and ignore the very real
work opportunities that do exist. Petitioner has failed to prove that he cannot perform the
essential functions of work he was qualified to perform, and has failed to prove that there is no
other work reasonably available.
Petitioner is insistent in his argument that a rigid matrix of job descriptions from the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles must be applied to the Farnsworth report of Petitioner's
purported restrictions. The difficulty with that is two-fold because the Farnsworth report is based
on erroneous information and therefore its conclusions are unreliable. Second, applying a matrix
mechanically excludes factors that should be considered, specifically, those factors contained in
Respondent's Exhibit R 4 and testified to by Ms. Bertsch. These not only contradicted
Petitioner's testimony that McDonald's would not hire him back, but identified actual jobs that
were available, would be adapted to his limitations and where he would have preference.
Petitioner testified that if he could get a job within his restrictions, he would go back to
work. However, he was awarded social security disability benefits of $1,028 per month, and it is
illogical that he would go back to work for five dollars per hour for 40 hours per week, or
approximately $800 per month, and lose $200 per month in income.
Contrary to Petitioner's representations, there is a preponderance of evidence
demonstrating that there is work available within Petitioner's limitations, and that he has the skill
and experience to return to work immediately if he were truly motivated to do so, and in fact
would be given preference at McDonald's. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim for permanent total
disability compensation should be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner Enrique Martinez's claim for permanent
total disability compensation benefits under his 7-31-2000 Application for Hearing against
Media-Paymaster Plus is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
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Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
DATED this 15th day of July, 2003.

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
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